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Beyond Regulation: The Indigenous
Problem of Attorney
Self-Importance and Abuse of
the English Language
Every profession has divergent public
personae: one that is its self-image, and
one which others have of it. Physicians,
for example, may view themselves as a
coterie of Marcus Welbys, but may not
perform quite as beneficently. They may
require regulation presuming a less char-
itable professional weltanschauung. A
tabula rasa objectivity is inhibited where
those examining, analyzing, indeed, judg-
ing, the verities lying behind abstruse
representations, are precluded from
direct experiential impact through the
distorting myopia of linguistic hyper-
bole.'
Lawyers certainly have a dichoto-
mous image: to themselves, they are
professionals with superior intelligence
and an expertise which they feel cannot
be appreciated easily outside the profes-
sion. They have been through the same
boot camp: law school's Socratic method.
There, most of them were mercilessly
cross-examined by professors, who had
little difficulty in making their every
utterance seem to be illogical and
thoughtless blathering. They have now
developed a limited ability to use this
same technique.
Many of them are now convinced
that they "think like a lawyer." This
means not to think emotionally, but
logically, carefully, and in a superior
fashion. The attorney self-image is one
of the "upper class" of our society-
those who solve problems, carry the
banner for the oppressed, fashion the
rules of law we all live by, and who are
society's true philosophers-able to think
through false arguments to arrive at
what is genuine and what is true.
To many outside the profession, the
image is very different. It is one of
overweening greed and amorality. It is a
profession which, rather than eliminating
I. See discussion infra; see also the
terribly impressive format of these first
three sentences.
the need for its services (the Greek defin-
ition of "profession"), seeks to create
complex systems-such as probate, im-
migration, tax and bankruptcy -which
unnecessarily require their services.
Generally, it is a profession of self-
indulgent arrogance, and whose basic
contribution to disputes is to exacer-
bate them.
Certainly both images are exagger-
ated. However, this negative public per-
ception is validated to a large extent by
two things: lawyers' manners, and their
abuse of the English language.
Self-Importance as an Art Form
Walking into the office of many at-
torneys can be intimidating for the aver-
age wage earner. Plush carpeting, walnut
paneling, and behind an impressive desk,
a wall of plaques designating degrees
and mysterious certificates of admission
to important courts. Offices typically
have ostentatious libraries, carefully
coifed and formal receptionists, and the
de rigueur high floor view of The City.
And it is not only those who work for a
living who are to be impressed; more
desirably, the attorneys practicing to-
gether seek to project success to each
other and to the powerful and wealthy
clientele many covet.
Attorneys follow a number of unwrit-
ten rules to project the proper self-
importance beyond the words they actual-
ly utter. For example, no counsel worth
his salt would ever place a phone call
himself. Better to have the secretary ask
for whomever is to be the lucky recipient:
"Mr. Attorney is calling for Ms. Smith,
is this Ms. Smith?" Once Ms. Smith is
interrupted, Attorney's secretary will
then say, "Ms. Smith, Mr. Attorney is
calling, one moment please." Then At-
torney will take a few seconds while Ms.
Smith, who was interrupted because
counsel was calling her, waits.
The second step in the procedure is
to put the call on the speaker phone.
Attorneys are convinced that hearing
their voice echo dimly from a speaker
phone exudes a sure sign of power.
Psychologically, this occurs quite
apart from the extra cost. Speaker
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phones indicate that the attorney is too
important to actually pick up the phone
(which is being "touched" by the other
party). Hence the other party is seeking
to be intimate or personal with the attor-
ney, who rejects the advance and main-
tains a haughty distance. Also, because
it is a speaker phone the attorney has to
speak more loudly than would be the
case in conversation which normal people
have. This volume communicates author-
ity and decisiveness even if the volume
itself does not reach the listener.
On occasion, the speaker phone also
gives the caller the chance to introduce
a third or fourth party to the conversa-
tion, often identified well after the con-
versation has begun. This can create the
impression of "holding court," or of at
least being a part of a dynamic group of
experts all interrelating very impres-
sively- impressing you and impressing
each other. A typical reference to a third
party would go like this: "John, I am
sitting here with Mary Jones from our
firm. Mary is the firm expert on the tax
implications of off-shore shelters and I
thought she should hear this." Actually,
the client may not be aware that Mary
knows very little about off-shore tax
shelters or that they are irrelevant to his
problem, but at some point he may
become aware that he is being billed for
the preliminary discussion counsel and
his firm associate have had on the sub-
ject, and that both counsel and the
associate are separately billing him.
On the first day at Harvard Law
School in 1967, famous Dean Erwin
Griswold instructed the incoming class
of 1970 on the proper demeanor for the
attorney. Never admit that you do not
know an answer. When asked a question
that you do not know the answer to,
stall and look it up. The stall has been
elevated to an art form by many lawyers.
Usually it is accompanied by a patroniz-
ing tone and references to the "complex-
ity" or the "interesting issues" raised by
the question. Or the attorney will imply
she could answer the question, but it is
too difficult to explain such a sophisti-
cated concept to the questioner in a way
likely to be comprehended.
After the early contacts, it is neces-
sary for counsel to refuse to actually
talk directly with his client. Counsel is
simply too busy and important to actual-
ly deign to call his client or to return
calls. Hence, most contact will be
through secretaries or associates. The
client may not understand that the attor-
ney, as with most professionals, makes
maximum money by hiring a great
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number of assistants and billing at a
high rate for their services. These auxili-
ary persons are themselves paid a rela-
tively low wage and the profit from
their work gives the attorney an extra-
ordinary income. As a side benefit, such
personal avoidance further reinforces
the power and self-importance of the
attorney.
The Language of the Profession
The most obvious symptom of over-
weening self-importance is pretentious
use of language. Attorneys could not get
away with pompous behavior simply
through telephone tricks or furniture.
They must convince us they are doing
something only they can do. To some
extent, what they do cannot be accomp-
lished easily by others, but attorneys
employ linguistic techniques to make
sure-and to add to the mystique of the
law. Some of this is justifiable, even
necessary. But the law is too basic to all
of our lives to be left to an elite sub-
language understood only by one group-
except to the extent necessary. Attorneys
go far beyond necessity.
Terms of Art. The first common at-
torney language abuse is the overuse of
jargon or "terms of art." Unlike many
scientific terms, most legal "terms of
art" are gratuitous; that is, they do
not describe something which cannot be
described in simpler form by a com-
monly-understood word. They are sheer
pretension.
What does a lawyer mean when she
says "extrinsic fraud," "in the instant
case," "prerogative writ," "discretion
vested in the court by the statutes,"
"subserves the interests," "after the
accrual of the cause of action," "condi-
tion precedent," "equitable servitude,"
or "collateral estoppel?" Are these words
representing thoughts easily expressed
by commonly-understood English? Yes.
Some terms of art may be necessary
to convey a special package of meaning
not conveyed efficiently by a longer
phrase of commonly-understood words.
But most legal terminology is not much
more efficient. Nor, by the way, is there
an enormous number of difficult words
for an attorney to know which might
convey special meaning. A typical attor-
ney will know approximately 300 words
with a special "legal sounding flavor"-
of these, about half will be totally un-
necessary as opposed to a normal English
word carrying the same message. And
of the 150 words used by the attorney
involving some genuine complex mean-
ing, he will be able to define accurately
about one-third of them.
Adding Suffixes. Lawyers sprinkle
their documents with words carrying
unnecessary suffixes. Instead of saying
"analysis," one might say "analyzation;"
"substantiality" instead of "substantial."
If you want a spontaneous demonstra-
tion, listen to Howard Cosell-who
routinely uses suffix-laden non-words
for pompous effect. Cosell is one of the
few more commonly heard voices trained
in the law.
Gratuitous Latin. Lawyers also
choose to augment their English with
Latin. Some attorneys will use the Latin
expression "vel non." "Vel non" simply
means "or not." Black's Law Dictionary
cites these examples: "So the sufficiency
vel non of the order of publication is
important;" "the negligence vel non of
the owner was for the jury."
Another favorite Latin term is "a
fortiori." This simply means "with strong-
er reason." For example, "Dr. Jones
testified that the defendant could read
the line of one-inch letters on the eye
chart. A fortiori the defendant could
also read the two-inch letters immediate-
ly above." This certainly sounds more
profound than "if he could read the
one-inch letters, he must have been able
to read the two-inch letters."
"Jus tertii" and "ab initio" flow easily
off the tongues of many attorneys, but
their translations-"the right of a third
party" and "from the beginning"-would
be preferable, even if they add a word
or two.
Lawyers know virtually nothing about
Latin, and the Latin phrases they do use
are readily translatable. "Sua sponte,"
"ipso facto," "pro per, ""sui generis,"
and other dignity-projecting words are
conveyed by the same number of English
words and with equal clarity.
Making Nouns From Verbs. Gram-
marians call making nouns from verbs
"nominalizing." Lawyers love to nom-
inalize. For example, an attorney will
write: "Failure of proper citation may
result in the rejection of an argument."
"Failure" from "to fail," "citation" from
"to cite," and "rejection" from "to reject"
are all examples. The attorney avoids
the verb for the noun, which has a
remote but pretentious ring. Avoiding a
verb means the sentence does not have
to specify which actor is doing the verb,
or what happens to it. Whose failure of
proper citation? Rejection by whom? A
normal person wanting to be understood
would write the above sentence as fol-
lows: "If an attorney does not cite
properly in his appellate brief, the court
may reject his arguments."
Using the Passive Voice. The voice
of a sentence defines how the subject
and verb relate. When the subject does
the action described by the verb, the
sentence is in the "active" voice. When
the verb acts upon the subject, the sen-
tence is in the "passive" voice. An attor-
ney will almost always use the passive
voice, or to repeat the last phrase in
legalese, the passive voice will almost
always be used by attorneys. The passive
voice allows the attorney to eliminate
the names of the actors, as do nominal-
izations: "if the motion is denied due to
the failure to timely file, the filing fee
may be refunded." Rejected by whom?
Refunded by whom?
The attorney will also avoid personal
pronouns. It is just not dignified enough
to say "We shall bill you on an hourly
rate. If you will enclose your check in
the envelope we send to you, we will be
better able to credit your account accur-
ately," when one can say "Billing will be
conducted on an hourly basis as accrued.
The enclosure of your check in the envel-
ope supplied with the bill will assist in
the accurate crediting of the users'
account."
False Verbal Limbs. An attorney will
stud her simple verbs, where she uses
them, with extra syllables to give her
sentences the appearance of symmetry:
"be subjected to," "give rise to," "take
effect," "exhibit a tendency to." These
words can be combined with a noun
and a general-purpose verb, such as
"prove," "serve," or "render," to project
profundity. "The document will exhibit
a tendency to render the mutual obliga-
tions voidable ipsofacto."
In addition, simple prepositions, "of,"
"to," and "by," are replaced by "with
respect to," "the fact that," and "in the
interests of."
Footnotes and Citing. Attorneys also
like to overcite and overfootnote. It is
interesting to read a controversial point
in something an attorney has written
and see it footnoted. The proposition
seems to be substantiated and the reader
nods acceptance silently and reads on.
Usually these cites do not provide sub-
stantiation,2 even if substantiation may
be available.3 Attorneys love to write
See..." or "See also..." in these footnotes,
and then cite cases having something
vaguely to do with the subject discussed.4
Or the note will refer forward to some
discussion on the same subject by the
attorney in the same document. Some-
times the same dubious point will be
made in the latter part of the document
where this cite refers, with a citation
back to the earlier discussion.5
If one wishes to spot the most sus-
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picious contentions of an attorney, one
merely needs to look at the density of
cites-often, the more citations the weak-
er the argument. There is also one other
sign: the use of words such as "clearly"
or "obviously." If an attorney precedes
a point with "clearly," that usually means
she has no proof or citation upon which
to rely.
The citations of attorneys are often
used in such a distorted way that they
may support the very opposite position
intended by the court writing the opin-
ion. As damning as such a description
of the intellectual honesty of attorneys
may appear, it is verifiable simply by
reviewing "memoranda of points and
authorities" submitted by attorneys to
courts and then reading the full opinions
of the cases cited to support various
propositions. Some attorneys will admit
readily in private that the impressive
pattern of citations in briefs and memor-
anda supporting motions is based on
cases they have never read (especially
citations submitted in motions at the
trial court level). Where the cases are
read, the distortions may be even more
egregious, since counsel will commonly
take isolated phrases in an opinion out
of context. Often, an attorney will quote
a judge who is pondering an argument
he later rejects.
Attorneys will, on occasion, actually
read the cases cited by another attorney;
the result of this is a hearing with in-
terminable haggling over what the writer
of the decision meant. It takes a great
deal of time to go through a long de-
cision to point out to a court at a hear-
ing that a citation is being incorrectly
used. Where an attorney has miscited
cases ten or twelve times in a document,
a hearing for which only ten minutes
has been allotted (which is typical) be-
comes a morass of confusing allegations
about what one court did or did not hold.
Attorneys are not held accountable
by anyone for their misuse of citations.
The judge receiving the citations, and
even opposing counsel, implicitly under-
stand that the citations are, to large
degree, window-dressing to make the
language of the document appear more
professional and significant to impress
the client.
Repeating Words. Attorneys love to
repeat words, phrases, clauses, and terms.
Just like that. Especially when writing
what they call a "legal" document, they
will try to make it sound "ironclad" by
repeating nouns and verbs. A contract
will not simply say that one party will
"sell" an item; rather, he will "sell,
assign, transfer, and deliver." A person
receiving an item will not merely receive
it for herself, but for her "heirs, assign-
ees, transferees, executors, and adminis-
trators." Most of this repetition is
unnecessary. Where needed, it may be
accomplished by drafting a short defini-
tion section in the document, and there
including a thesaurus of synonyms relat-
ing to chosen single words to be used in
the document itself. Of course, then the
document would be easy to understand.
Someone might get the idea that the
work of the attorney is not quite as
momentous as he or she wishes it to be
perceived.
The Attorney Drafts a Contract.
The following is a form for a "Building
Loan Bond." It is a standard form of
the New York Board of Title Under-
writers and appears in "Model Legal
Forms."
Know All Men by These Pre-
sents, that I, __ of __, am held
and firmly bound unto - of
- in the sum of - dollars,
lawful money of the United States,
to be paid to the said __, or his
executors, administrators, or
assigns, for which payment to be
made I bind myself, and my heirs,
executors, and administrators, firm-
ly by these presents.
The condition of the above ob-
ligation is such that if the above-
bounden __, his heirs, executors,
or administrators, shall pay or
cause to be paid unto the above-
named _ the sum of - dollars
on the . day of _ 19 ......,
with interest thereon at the rate of
- percent per annum, payable
semiannually (etc.), then the above
obligation to be void; otherwise
to remain in full force and virtue.
And it is hereby expressly
agreed that the whole of said prin-
cipal sum shall become due at the
option of the said obligee after
default....
The next sentence of the "model"
contract is two pages long; here are a
few excerpts:
...and the said obligee, and his
legal representatives or assigns
shall be at liberty and have the
right immediately after any such
default, upon a complaint filed or
any other legal proceedings com-
mended for the foreclosure of said
mortgage, to apply for, and shall
be entitled as a matter of right
and without regard to the value
of the premises, or the solvency
or insolvency of said obligor or
any owner of the mortgaged prem-
ises, and on - days' notice to
said obligor, his legal representa-
tives or assigns, in any court of
competent jurisdiction, to have
granted a receiver of the rents,
issues, and profits of the said
mortgaged premises, with power
to lease said premises for a term
to be approved by the court, with
power to pay and to keep the
same insured, and with power
to....
The ultimate in this sort of verbal
overkill is the standard maritime "charter
party" which is a commercial contract
to lease a ship. This 300-year-old docu-
ment is still being used by American
maritime lawyers and contains 25,000
words.
Lawyers typically defend the use of
arcane and confusing terminology with
the excuse that it has been tested in the
courts; thus, documents using such
words are not subject to suit for interpre-
tation. This justification locks in incom-
prehensible language for all time, since-
unless reversed-these "inflexible" court
decisions forever rule.
Writing Our Laws. Unfortunately,
persons trained in the systematic abuse
of the English language are also writing
our laws. Even if a legislator is not an
attorney, and many are, she will give a
proposed bill to one to redraft in the
appropriate "legal language." Let's take
a fairly typical California statute, SB
315 (Holmdahl). This purpose of the bill
is simply to allow husband and wife to
split their assets when they divorce (or
separate) without paying any tax, since
the property split is not a sale but a
division between two people. Simple
enough? Sure. A legislation class at
Loyola University, not trained in "the
law," apparently wrote it as follows:
There is no tax under this Act
when husband and wife divide
property between themselves be-
cause they are ending their
marriage, or nullifying it, or legal-
ly separating.
On the document which would
otherwise be taxed, husband or
wife shall sign a statement saying
that this exemption applies.
The California bill as drafted by
lawyers and as introduced reads as
follows:
11927.(a) Any tax imposed
pursuant to this part shall not
apply with respect to any deed,
instrument, or other writing which
purports to transfer, divide, or al-
locate community, quasi-commu-
nity, or quasi-marital property
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assets between spouses for the pur-
pose of effecting a division of
community, quasi-community, or
quasi-marital property which is re-
quired by a judgment decreeing a
dissolution of the marriage or
legal separation, by a judgment of
nullity, or by any other judgment
or order rendered pursuant to Part
5 (commencing with Section 4000)
of Division 4 of the Civil Code,
or by a written contemplation of
any such judgment or order,
whether or not the written agree-
ment is incorporated as part of
any of those judgments or orders.
(b) In order to qualify for the
exemption provided in subdivision
(a), the deed, instrument, or other
writing shall include a written re-
cital, signed by either spouse, stat-
ing that the deed, instrument, or
other writing is entitled to the
exemption.
George Spanos, the attorney who
drafted the statute for Holmdahl, ex-
plained the need for his more elaborate
version as follows: "Although it is desir-
able to simplify the language of the law,
it's also important that you do not ignore
some of the verbal conventions and
subtleties that, for better or worse, have
crept into legal language. When a new
law is enacted that modifies existing law
and makes reference to established con-
cepts, it is sometimes necessary to con-
tinue to use the same designations or
categories so no new ambiguities are
created." I suppose this means we are all
trapped forever. What we are being told
is that legislatures, courts, and attorneys
understand legalese, and they may be
unable to translate what they have done
previously in legalese into understand-
able English. They are apparently now
unable to relate meaningfully to the
English language.
The Fount. To understand what has
happened to this species of person called
"attorney," one must examine the fount:
the law school. For here is where the
attorney learns the new language, and
apparently forgets the old one. Do pro-
fessors develop this new language con-
sciously? Indeed they do.
The grand fount has always been
Harvard Law School-where we suffered
three years of self-importance training.
The faculty of that institution includes
some of the worst teachers in the nation,
but they are legal scholars. Translated,
this means they can take a very simple
idea and make it into one that sounds
very complicated and obscure. Anything
complicated and obscure must be deep
and profound.
A current illustration of the example
set by this leading institution is a docu-
ment floating around most of the law
schools of the United States; a document
which is the product of many Harvard
professors. They will debate the subject
interminably and do very little, but the
nature of the debate tells us a great deal
about the pretension visited upon the
students by this faculty.
In its final draft version, this work
borne of several years of debate is now
seriously being discussed by law faculties
throughout the land. It is commonly
viewed as a "brilliant" exposition of cur-
rent curriculum problems. So what does
the language of the masters tell us about
the way in which the lawyers of the
future are being trained? Here is one of
the more eloquent passages:
Doctrinal mastery cannot by
itself provide an intellectual base
for life-long critical reflectiveness
about legal institutions, the profes-
sion, and one's own work, in the
actual and changing conditions of
social life and legal practice. For
those purposes, students need to
become conversant with learning
and argument about the nature
and functions of law and legal
institutions; about their historical
and cultural contingencies, and the
varieties and modes of social order-
ing; and about the moral and pol-
itical outlooks immanent in bodies
of legal doctrine, institutional sys-
tems, conceptions of professional
role, theories of law, and approach-
es to their study.
The Layperson Imitators. The layper-
son imitators of legalese illustrate both
its artificiality and the success of attor-
neys in making it the sine qua non to
entry into the legal system. (Are you
impressed?) Attorneys love to sneer at
attempts by laypeople to imitate their
legalese. Following is an excerpt from a
fairly typical document filed by someone
who learned English as a second lang-
uage and is attempting legalese as a
third. It was filed in a format thought
by the filer to be appropriate, following
his arrest.
Attentively, I, __, a Mexican
National, 57 years old with domi-
cile at Tijuana, B.C. Mexico being
cited to appear in Court on the
9th. of January 1979 for investi-
gation charges, I hereby with all
my respects appear before you in
order to expose the motive, same
one which obliges me to refuse
for the services of the defense,
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concerning this charge, defense
ordered by Your Honor and by
the Court.
MY REASONS: I/st., Due to
the Spanish in which I am interro-
gated, this Spanish is limited
reason why I don't quite under-
stand at all.
2/nd., That I understand that
the defense of my case, entrusted
to Atty. ___. it is an Official one
or else a routine requirement.
3/rd., Due to the seriousness
and gravity of this charge against
me, it urgently drives me to prove
my innocence (not guilty).
Reason why I solicit from that
Honorable Court it may be grant-
ed the right which the Law of this
Country grants me, in order to
ask formally the quick annulation
of the defense in my case directed
by Attorney - Also to present
within a brief time, after search-
ing the real truth to the facts oc-
curred at the time of my detention
by the Police in Chula Vista,
California.
This particular document captures
the basic personality of current legalese,
exposed in its reality by the exaggerated
misuse of vague terms and by its syntax.
Another illustration is a statement
made to the probation department by a
nonlawyer defendant who was urged to
write a description of the events leading
to his arrest which would impress the
court-something that sounds "lawyer-
like." Here is the product:
On the (7) seventh of January
a suitcase was brought to Ocean
Beach by a person unknown to
me. The deliverers name was Tim
and he drove a Datsun pickup. At
approximately (10:30) ten thirty
the described vehicle, a premoni-
tion solicited to me, approached
and stopped at the predesignated
location. After introduction and
speculation of various intricacies
a stipulation, not omnious on my
behalf was endeavored to trans-
port the suitcase and myself to
Lindbergh Field. Upon arrival at
American Airlines terminal the
driver, Tim, entrusted me with a
pecuniary subsidation, ticket to
Cincinnati Ohio and a yellow suit-
case. Farewells were expounded
and we parted. I entered the term-
inal check my baggage and went
into a lounge at approximately
(11: 10) eleven ten. While receiving
boarding pass at approximately
(11:45) eleven forty five I was
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arrested. My most veracious and
inherent sanction for this elicit
paradox was for transportation to
my home state.
I am not an incessant violator
of the jurisprudence of this coun-
try nor is it contended that I shall
be. I ecstatically adhere to the
tenet that victumus crimes en-
compass me and circumstance ef-
fuse this idiosyncrasy that is me,
beguiling my true virtues. I have
foibles just as others but incentive-
ly endeavor to attain a substantial
degree of knowledge. Vast difficul-
ties have impeded this meander of
subjugation but in contrast an im-
plicit entreaty with an educational
institution is imminent. Therefore
I ask only for a propriety that is
befitting.
Attorneys love to make fun of these
efforts to emulate them. They are very
much relieved that it is difficult to copy
the pretentious style with the grace need-
ed to preserve some semblance of mean-
ing-at least enough meaning so that
some small scintilla of message is impart-
ed. It is unfortunate that attorneys do
not understand how closely related their
use of the language is to the attempts of
those who imitate them.
The Reason. The heart of the law
may be the impenetrable language that
lawyers use, sometimes at great length.
Commentators have speculated that it is
a direct outgrowth of the English prac-
tice of paying lawyers by the word for
their briefs-which are, as a result,
rarely brief.
Other professions, most notably jour-
nalists, are making serious efforts to use
simpler language. These professions rec-
ognize that the goal of writing or speak-
ing is-after all-communication. The
lawyer's goal, however, may be obfusca-
tion. Fred Dutton (White House aide in
the Kennedy Administration and now a
successful Washington, D.C. attorney),
has been quoted remarking candidly:
Lawyers are paid to compli-
cate, to keep a dispute alive, to
make everything technical. The
Washington, D.C. firm of Coving-
ton and Burling, for example,
once delayed for twelve years a
Food and Drug Administration
ruling on the labeling of peanut
butter jars. Said one Covington
lawyer: "Certainly, there's some-
thing suspicious about a 24,000-
page hearing transcript and close
to 75,000 pages of documents on
a case involving peanut butter!"
As we have seen, 75,000 pages does
not mean much was said. George Orwell
was not writing about lawyers in his
famous essay Politics and the English
Language, but he could have been: "The
great enemy of clear language is insin-
cerity. When there is a gap between
one's real and one's declared aims, one
turns as it were instinctively to long
words and exhausted idioms, like a cut-
tlefish squirting out ink."
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